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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
HAZEL 0. SANFORD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, an
agency of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
12167

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for property damage arising
out of flooding of plaintiff's property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A jury verdict was returned in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, University of
Utah, in the sum of $13,687.00. Thereafter, upon
motion made by the defendant, University of Utah,
the lower court modified the judgment on the verdict and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and against the University of Utah for the sum of
$13,187.00 with costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The University of Utah seeks reversal of the
judgment of the lower Court. The University wants
an Order from this Court directing the lower Court
1

to enter judgment in its favor and against the
plainiff, no cause of action. In the alternative, if
said Order is not made, then the University wants
an Order from this Court directing that a new trial
be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Hazel 0. Sanford, is the owner
of property designated as 8 North Walcott in Salt '
Lake City, Utah (R. 229). The University of Utah
is an agency of the State of Utah, owning real
property situated easterly of the plaintiff's property in Salt Lake City (Ex. 16-D) . The natural
drainage is from the east to the west, or from '
the University property toward plaintiff's lot (Ex.
24-D).
1

1

The University of Utah is the only State agency
or entity designated as a defendant (R. 10). The
State Building Board is charged with the responsibility under Section 63-10-7, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended, 1965, with the preparation of plans,
designs and specifications and the supervision over
designs, construction and installation of structures
at State institutions. The pertinent part of the
statute is as follows:
"63-10-7. Power and duties. - The Utah
state building board shall carry out the building and expansion program of the state provided by law, as and when funds are from
time to time available. The board is given
power and authority to do any and all things
2

which in its jud.gment may be necessary or
proper f?r car:rymg out the provisions of this
chapter mcludmg, but not limited to the following express powers and duties: '
( 1) To cause to be prepared in conjunction with the institutions a master plan of
structures built or contemplated, and to be
prepared for submittal to the governor and
the legislature a comprehensive ten - year
building plan for the state of Utah suggesting priority for all state institutions on the
basis of present and future need. The plan
shall include all proposed buildings which are
to be constructed wholly or in part with state
funds and all proposed repairs and alterations of existing buildings of the state and
of the departments, commissions, institutions,
and agencies of the state. Such plan shall
include maps, information and substantiating
data to support the adequacy of the plans
projected, and estimates of the cost of each
project.
(2) * * *
(3)
(4)

*

*

*
*

*
*

( 5) To cause to be prepared and submitted, either by its own employees or others,
designs, plans and specifications for the various buildings and improvements, and other
work to be carried out by the board; to determine, with the approval of the governor, the
need for all alterations and repairs to all
existing buildings of the state and of the departments, commissions, institutions and agencies of the state where the estimated cost
is in excess of $8,000, and to exercise super3

vision over the design, construction and installation of heating plants and appurtenances
thereto in all state buildings; provided, that
no building shall be constructed, improvements made or work done for, or on the property of, any state institution until the location,
design, plans and specifications therefor shall
be approved by the board, commission or officials charged with the administration of the
affairs of such institution.
'(6)

*

* *

(8)
(9)

*
*

*

( 7) To make contracts for any work
which the board is authorized by law to do
or cause to be done; provided that in any
contract for architectural or engineering services the board, as a condition of the contract,
may prohibit the architect or engineer from
retaining a sales or agent engineer fer the
necessary design work; and provided that
any contract except those for professlon;:;J
services to be let to the lowest bidde1· who
in the judgment of the board. is responsible
and qualified to do the work. The judgrnsnt
of the board as to the responsibility and qn::i.1ifications of such bidders shall be
except in case of fraud or bad faith. The
manner of calling for bids, the kind and time
of notice, the conditions thereof, and all other
matters connected therewith shall be snch as
the board may from time to time prescribe.

(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

*

*

*
*
*

*
*
*

*

*
*
*

To be sued In the name of the
4

Utah state building board only upon written
contracts made by it or under its authority
and sealed with its official seal.
(14) * * *
( 15) * * *
(16) To supervise the expenditure of
funds in providing plans, engineering specifications, sites, and construction of the buildings for which legislative appropriations have
been made and to specifically allocate moneys
appropriated where more than one project is
included in any single appropriation without
legislative directive. The board shall expend
the amounts necessary from said appropriations for planning, engineering and architectural work. Such amounts as may be necessary to cover expenditures previously made
from any building board planning fund in
the preparation of plans, engineering and
specifications shall be returned to said fund.
(17)
(18)

*

*
(19) *

*

*
*

*
*
*

The State Road Commission is charged with
the discretion to design, build and maintain roads
and parking spaces on the grounds of State institutions under Sections 27-12-7 and 27-12-8, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended.
The material parts of the statutes are:
"27-12-7. General powers and duties of commission. - The commission shall administer
the state highways and exercise those powers
5

and duties which relate to the detennination
and carrying out of the general policy of the
state relating thereto. It shall exercise such
c o n t r o 1 over the location, establishment,
changing, construction and maintenance of
highways as is provided by law.
"27-12-8. Specific powers and duties of commission enumerated. - The commission shall
have the following powers and duties in addi·tion to such other powers and duties as may
be provided by law:
( 1) To formulate and adopt rules and
regulations and establish programs for the
expenditure of public funds for the construction, improvement and maintenance of state
highways, and other purposes authorized by
law, and for letting contracts for any work
which the commission is authorized by law
to do.
(2) To determine what portion or portions of any state highway shall be improved
at the expense of the state.
(3) To make agreements with the approval of the governor on behalf of the state
of Utah with other states and the United
States Government, or any department of the
same, in any manner affecting the state highways.
( 4) to (16) * * *
( 17) To expend sufficient of the funds
allocated to the commission to accomplish the
purposes of this act."
Under Section 27-12-17, the State Road Commission
charged with the discretion to build and
6

maintain roads and parking spaces on the grounds
of State institutions. This statute reads:
"27-12-17. Roads and parking spaces in connection with state institutions and areas for
recreational activities. - The state road commission is hereby authorized at its discretion
to build and maintain roads leading to roads
and parking spaces on the grounds of state
institutions to which roads have not been designated by the legislature; also roads and
parking spaces to serve areas used for salt
flat races, ski meets, and activities which are
promoted for the general welfare when such
area.c::; are in immediate proximity to a designated highway."
Section 27-12-67, designates the peripheral road
of the University of Utah campus as a State highway. The pertinent part of the statute is:
"27-12-67. State Highways - Routes 181-A
to 184-A.-The following named roads to and
on the grounds of state institutions are designated as state highways:
(a) Route 181-A. 1.
2. From 500 South Street north via
Guardsman Way to the Peripheral Road.
3. From Fifth South Street northerly
via Fifteenth East Street; thence easterly and
southerly via the completed portion of the
Peripheral Road to Wasatch Drive; * * *"
Pictorally, Exhibit 16-D, shows the relation of
the University property to the plaintiff's property,
the location of State Highway 181-A on the Uni7

versity of Utah Campus running northerly from
5th South via 15th East. This exhibit depicts the
Merrill Building located on the northeast corner of
the intersection of the Peripheral Road and Federal Way as the area was in the Fall of 1964 and
prior to the start of the construction of the parking
lot, located immediately north of the Merrill Building. Exhibit 1.6-D does not show the construction
in progress on date of the flood. No party has an
exhibit showing this.
The Peripheral Road was designed by the State
Highway Department (R. 503). Mr. Kimball, the
Directo1· of the Physical Plants and University Engineer in 1967 had nothing to do with the design
or construction of the Peripheral Road ( R. 503).
Harry E. Wilbert, District Engineer for the State
Highway department from 1959 to 1961 in charge
of the district wherein State Highway 181-A was
located, testified it was the duty of the State Highway Department to supervise, maintain and construct all State highways and that U-181-A on the
University of Utah campus was designed by the
State Highway Department and constructed under
the supervision of the State Highway Department
( R. 510) . The University of Utah did not design
or supervise the building of the Peripheral Road.
During 1967, the State Building Board let contracts for landscaping and construction of the parking lot north of the Merrill Building and east of
the Peripheral Road. The purpose of the contract
8

was to increase the parking space north of the Merrill Building from 150 to 800 automobiles (R. 504).
The contract for the parking lot was let by the
State Building Board to Gibbons & Reed (R. 513).
The parking lot was designed for the State Building Board by Karsten Hansen, a landscape architect,
and the supervision of the construction of the parking lot, including installation of catch basins and
drains, was done by the Utah State Building Board
(R. 513). The University of Utah did not prepare
the design and did not designate the manner in
which construction on the parking lot was to proceed (R. 513).
In July of 1967, at the time the parking lot
was under construction, a heavy rain storm struck
the University of Utah campus. At 187 J Street
in Salt Lake City, an area slightly west and north
of the plaintiff's property, 1.88 inches of precipitation was received in a Ii ttle over one hour ( R. 584) .
When the storm struck, the catch basins had been
built in the Peripheral Road at the lowest spot west
of the parking lot (see Exhibit 13-T) and the parking lot was in a stage of partial completion ( R. 529).
vVhen the storm struck, the parking lot was enclosed
by concrete curbs along the west side. Two catch
basins with drains were built. Gibbons and Reed
had the rough grading complete and gravel was
being hauled in to form a base for the asphalt pavement to be laid later. The storm washed the gravel
into the catch basins plugging all of them and caus9

ing the flood water to overflow the west curb of
the parking lot, flood down on to the peripheral road
and down toward the plaintiff's property. This
mud and debris then washed across the grass west
of the peripheral road and onto the plaintiff's property. Exhibits 17-D to 23-D, inclusive, depict the
condition between the west edge of the parking lot
and the west side of the peripheral road following
the flood.
Since the completion of the paving in the parking lot, there has been no further flooding of plaintiff's property. In instructing the jury, the lower
court advised the plaintiff could recover for defecti ve conditions and refused to instruct the jury that
in order for the plaintiff to recover the plaintiff
must show that the defective conditions were proximately caused by the negligence of the university
(R. 134-155).
The university claims that in giving Instructions No. 14, No. 16 and No. 17, prejudicial error
was committed.
Because the instructions are long, the university has italicized the prejudicial parts.
INSTRUCTION NO. 14
The University of Utah is an instrumentality
of the State of Utah and as such is subject to the
same laws regarding liability for injury as is the
State or its political subdivisions, and our legislature
10

has provided that as of July 1, 1966, such governmental enties shall be liable for injuries resulting
from activities of said entities only under specific
circumstances as enumerated in our statutes.
Thus, insofar as the issues of this case are concerned, under the laws of the State of Utah, the
defendant University of Utah as a governrnental
entity may be held liable for any injury:
(a) Caused by a defective condition of a
culvert; or
(b) Caused from a defective condition of
any -public irnprovernent; provided such defective condition is not a "latent defective condition," as by statute no liability exists for injury
caused by a "latent defective condition" in a
public irnprovement as that term is elsewhere
herein defined.
Therefore, in order for plaintiff to recover for
injuries sustained by her, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her injuries, for
which she herein seeks to recover, were oaused by
one or both of the foregoing listed alleged defective
conditions. (Emphasis added)

As used in these instructions, the term "defective condition" means a condition which, though not
inherently dangerous, nevertheless constitutes an
unreasonable hazard, that is, a condition from which
injury to those affected thereby might reasonably
11

be anticipated, and the term "latent defective condition" means a defective condition which could not
have been discovered by careful inspection, and, as
used in these instructions, the term "injury" includes damage to or loss of property, real or perpersonal. (R. 148)."
The error was compounded by the giving of
Instructions 16 and 17 .

.

Instruction Number 16 reads :

"Before you can find for the pl.aintif f, you must
find from a prepoderance of the evidence, with respect to which the plaintiff has the burden of proof,
that each of the following propositions is true:
PROPOSITION 1: That before July 16, 1967,
in constructing its improvements, the defendant
changed, or caused to be changed, the natural
flow for drainage of surface water from its or
surrounding property.
PROPOSITION 2: That in doing so it created
a drainage system.
PROPOSITION 3: That the improvement thus
created had a defective condition in
(a) A culvert, and/or
(b) In the public improvement itself that
was not a latent defective condition.
PROPOSITION 4: That the defendant knew,
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
12

known of the existence of either defective condition, if any. (Emphasis added)
PROPOSITION 5: That such defective condition, if any, caused injury to the plaintiff.

Thus, if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that each and all of the foregoing propositions are true, you should find the issues in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant and assess
damages in accordance with the instructions hereinafter given you. On the other hand, if you find
from a preponderance of the evidence that any one
or more of the foregoing propositions is not true,
then you should find the issues in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff of no cause of
action (R.150).
Instruction Number 17 reads :
"If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, it will be your duty to
award her such damages, if any, as you may find
from a preponderance of the evidence, with respect
to which plaintiff has the burden of proof, will
fairly and adequately compensate her for any injury
she has sustained because of damage to her property caused by a defective condition on defendant's
improvements.

In this case, plaintiff claims damages in three
categories and any recovery must be limited to an
13

allowance for such damages as claimed. Those categories are:
1. For personal property lost from the flood,
if any, and the measure of damages for this
injury is the fair market value as of July 16,
1967, of any personal property so lost.
2. For damage, if any, to property, both
real and personal, resulting from the flooding
water, and the measure of damages for these
items is the reasonable cost of repairing each
item of damage as of July 16, 1967.
3. For diminution in value of the real property, if any, caused by a threat of future floods,
if any, which such threat must arise out of a
now existing defective condition in defendant's
iniprovements. (Emphasis added). Plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover for any temporary diminution caused by existing defective conditions in the past, which diminution might disappear if such defective condition, if any, no
longer exists. Thus, in considering this item
of damage you must first find that any diminution of value to the property by reason of
existing flood threat and caused by defective
conditions in defendant's improvements now
exists. If you find that such diminution does
now exist, then you rn ust lirni t your a ward to
such diminution as occurred after, and did not
exist on, July 1, 1966, the date upon which the
14

defendant's immunity from liability for injury
caused by a defective condition in its improvements was terminated.
In this case, plaintiff does not seek and is not
entitled to recover for any damages arising from
the 1963 flood, and such damages, if any, are not
a part of this lawsuit.
Plaintiff is not entitled to recover for speculative damages, by which is meant compensation for
injury which, although possible, is remote, conjectural or speculative in character.
The forms of verdict furnished to you will contain a separate space for listing damages, if any,
awarded in each of the three categories, and if you
find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant, you should list the amount of damages, if any, which you award with respect to each
category.
The term "fair market value" means the price
at which a seller, having property which he is willing to sell but was not under a compulsion to sell,
could and would sell the property to a buyer who
was willing to buy, but was under no compulsion
to buy (R. 151)."
The University's requested instructions on negligence were denied as not applicable ( R. 112).
Nowhere in the instructions was the jury told
that before it could award a verdict to the plaintiff,
15

the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the negligence of the University proximately caused the damage of which the plaintiff
complains (R. 134-55).
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
As the Court's ruling involved the interpretation of the Governmental Immunity Act, the following sections of the Act are set forth for ready
reference:
"63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities
from suit. - Except as may b8 otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities
shall be immune from suit for any injury
which may result from the activities of said
entities wherein said entity is engaged in the
exercise and discharge of a governmental
function."
"63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as
admission or denial or liability - Effect of
waiver of immunity. - Nothing contained in
this act, unless specifically provided, is to be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as governmental
entities are concerned. Wherein ininvunity
from S'Uit is waived by this act, consent to be
sued is granted and liability of the entity slwll
be detennined a,,r;; if the entity were a P'l'ivate
person." (Emphasis added.)
"63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges or other structures. - Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused
by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition
16

of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or
other structure located thereon."
"63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury
from dangerous or defective public building,
structure, or other public improvement - Exception. - Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused
from a dangerous or defective condition of
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir
or other public improvement. Immunity is
not waived for latent defective conditions."
"63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions. - Immunity from suit
of all governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act
or omission of an employee committed within
the scope of his employment except if the
lllJUry:
( 1) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused, or
* * *

*

*

*

*

*

*"

( 4) arises out of a failure to make an
inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, or
17

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS THE DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS WERE
NOT CAUSED OR CREATED BY PERSONS
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OR CONTROL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, IT IS NOT
LIABLE.

The University of Utah is not responsible for
the acts, conduct, omissions or defective conditions
created or caused by other state agencies or other
persons not subject to supervision or control of the
University of Utah.
The peripheral road, 181-A, winding across the
University of Utah property, was designed and constructed under the supervision of the State Road
Commission. Under Sections 27-12-7 and 27-12-8,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, the State
Road Commission is charged with the duty to establish programs for the expenditure of public funds
for the construction and maintenance of the state
highways. The University of Utah is not empowered to design, build or maintain State highways.
The testimony of Mr. Wilbert, District Engineer for the State Highway Department, shows the
peripheral road U181-A was built by the State Highway Department and that the University of Utah
had nothing to do with its design, construction or
maintenance. The statement of Mr. Clayton Kimball, the University of Utah Engineer, shows the
University did not design, control or supervise the
18

design or construction of U181-A, including the
catch basins for draining off water.
The University of Utah is not empowered to
design and construct buildings and other improvements on its property. The Merrill Building, the
parking lot to the north of it, were designed and
constructed under the supervision of the State Building Board. Actual construction of the parking lot
was contracted by the State Building Board to Gibbons & Reed Construction Company. This company
did all the construction except for the landscaping,
which was contracted out by the State Building
Board to Karsten Hansen.
The State Building Board has a duty and is
empowered by Section 63-10-7 (5) to cause to be
prepared the design and plans for buildings and
improvements on the University of Utah campus
and is further empowered with the duty to make
contracts for improvements under Section 63-107 ( 7). The State Building Board caused the design
of the Merrill Building and the parking lot to be
made and it, not the University of Utah, contracted
with Gibbons & Reed Construction Company and
Karsten Hansen for the construction of the parking
lot and the landscaping.
The University of Utah did not have any supervision over the design or construction of the parking lot, including the landscaping and design of
drainage and catch basins to take water from the
parking lot to storm drainage.
19

There is no evidence in the record to show that
the University of Utah controlled the work being
done by the contractors for the State Building Board
or that it in any way supervised, directed or interfered with the construction undertaken by the contractors for the State Building Board.
The issue is then :
Is the University of Utah liable for defective
conditions where it has no control or supervision?
Under Utah law, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for collateral acts of
negligence of an independent contractor causing
damage to third persons. It is also a principle of
law that where the employer has no right of control over the agent, then the employer is not responsible for the acts or omissions of the agent.
In Callahan v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 300,
125 P. 863 (1912), the plaintiff sought to recover
from the Salt Lake City Corporation for damage
arising from an obstructed gutter. In Callahan v.
Salt Lake City, supra, Salt Lake City employed
E. J. Moran, a contractor, to grade and pave 5th
East and during the course of this work Moran
obstructed the gutter so it would not carry off water
and when a rain storm occurred water was diverted
into the plaintiff's house. In his contract with Salt
Lake City, Moran was required to do all things to
prevent accidents and to execute his work in a good
and substantial manner and the City reserved the
20

right to discharge incompetent or disorderly persons.
In deciding the Callahan case in favor of Salt
Lake City, the Court pointed out that the City had
no right to give orders or directions directly to
Moran's employees and further pointed out that the
nature of the work contracted out was not of the
ultrahazardous or non-delegable nature and stated
that hence the work to be contracted did not necessarily bring about the result and the City was not
liable.
Badertescher v. Independent Ice Co., 55 Utah
100, 184 P. 181 ( 1919 is another early Utah case
stating the test of responsibility in the employment
of an agent. In this case a bicyclist while delivering
papers before the daylight collided with the tongue
of the defendant's wagon which was illegally parked
across the sidewalk with a load of coal. The wagon
was owned by the ice company
the driver w2s
paid by the ice company and remained on the ice
company's payroll and could only be discharged by
the ice company. In the winter and at the time of
the accident, the wagon and driver were leased to
the coal company and the driver took orders from
the coal company relating to delivery of coal. The
trial court granted a non-suit in favor of the ice
company and submitted the case to the jury on the
claims of the plaintiff against the coal company.
This Court affirmed the lower Court, saying the
test respecting responsibility is by which company
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was he employed and for whom was he acting in
delivering the coal. Manifestly for that purpose, he
was employed by the coal company and not the ice
company and for delivering the coal he was the
agent of the coal company and its employee.
Dowsett v. Dowsett, 160 Utah 12, 207 P. 2d
809 (1949) is another case pointing out that where
the party has no control as to the manner in which
work is performed or acts done that the employer
of the agent is in a similar position as the employer
of an independent contractor. In the Dowsett case,
Darwin Dowsett was in the service in Texas and
after he got quarters for his wife asked his parents
to drive her to Texas. The accident occurred when
his father was driving an automobile with his mother
sitting in the front seat. As the father rounded
a curve he lost control stating that he was blinded
by the sun. There is no showing that Darwin Dowsett had any control over the manner in which the
automobile was operated. In this case the Court
clearly pointed out that the rendering of the service
did not make master or principal responsible saying
that the master or principal are responsible if the
agent is subject to control as to the manner in which
the service or acts constituting the agency were performed.
No Utah statute or case makes one government
entity or agency the agent of another government
entity or agency merely because a benefit is being
conferred. The government entities operate out of
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separate budgets and are empowered by statute to
handle entirely unrelated governmental activities.
The fact they operate on distinct and separate
appropriations implies that one government entity
is not the agent of another.
The Governmental Immunity Act, conveys the
conclusion that one agency is not responsible for the
acts or omissions of another where governmental
immunity is waived by authorizing entities to purchase liability insurance separately out of their own
funds.
Since the plan is for the entities to purchase the
insurance and not for the state to purchase a blanket
policy, the inference is that each entity is to be responsible for its own acts and ommissions and that
it is not responsible for the acts or omissions of other
State entities or agencies.
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, 1965, requires notice only to the government agency concerned. Section 63-30-14, Utah
Code Annotated, as amended, 1965, relating to denial of claims imports that it is the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier that has the responsibility to approve or deny.
The University of Utah concedes the building
of State Highway U181-A by the State Road Com23

mission is a benefit and service to the University.
It also concedes that the construction of the Merrill
Building, the adjacent parking lot, including catch
basins and drains by contractors employed by the
State Building Board and supervised by the State
Building Board, is a benefit to the University.
However, as the University had no control,
supervision or right of control or supervision over
the design, construction of the highway, including
catch basins, or the design, construction and execution of the contracted work of building the parking
lot, including the design, it is not responsible under
general principles of agency.
The proper parties against whom the plaintiff
should have proceeded would have been the State
Building Board, the State Road Commission, and
their contractors, and not the University, which was
not in control of the situation.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
ON NEGLIGENCE.

Was it the intent of the legislature in passing
the Governmental Immunity Act to put a person
claiming liability for damages against the state
entity in a better position that the same person
would be if he were claiming damages against the
private individual?
The instructions to the jury, particularly Instructions No. 14 and No. 16, were designed to allow
24

the plaintiff to recover without showing negligence
on the part of the university in creating or causing
the creation of the defective condition. As such, the
instructions imposed a higher standard of care on
the university than would have been imposed on a
private person under the same circumstances or
would have been imposed on cities and towns for
which immunity is waived under the prior statute,
§10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Section 63-30-4 of the Immunity Act provides
that it is the intent of the legislature to put a claimant against a government entity in the same position
as if his claim were against a private individual.
Private persons in Utah are not strictly liable
for defective conditions. A private person must be
shown to be negligent in proximately causing a defective or dangerous condition before liability exists.
In Rhiness vs. Dansie, 472 P.2d 428 (Utah
1970), a gate to the defendant's horse pasture was
found open after the vehicle in which the plaintiff
was riding collided with one of the defendant's
horses on the highway. The court said the mere fact
that the animal escaped from the enclosure was not
sufficient evidence to create a jury question on negligence or liability. Leaving the gate open made
the enclosure of the horses effective.
In Robison vs. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d
87 6 ( 1964) , blasting was being done in a remote
farm area where there was Ii ttle likelihood of in25

juries to persons and the plaintiff was injured when
rocks were thrown against them by a dynamite
explosion. This court in affirming a judgment for
the defendant said the defendant was not liable
unless the likelihood of injury was foreseeable and
refused to apply the law of strict liability for this
dangerous activity.
Utah refuses to hold the owner of property
strictly liable for the spread of fire. In II an ks rs.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960),
the defendant started a fire, depending on a fire
break, to protect against its spread. A wind came
up and the fire spread over the break. This court
said that the plaintiff in order to recover must prore
negligence and refused to allow recovery on the basis
of strict liability for the spread of fire and affirmed
a judgment in favor of the defendant, no cause of
action.
With respect to abnormally dangerous conditions or activities, the doctrine of strict liability as
originally stated in the case of Rylands vs. Fletcher,
3 H & C 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 3 H.L. 330 (1868),
is not the law in Utah. In Rylands vs. Fletcher the
defendants, mill owners in Lancashire, constructed
a reservoir upon their land then water broke through
from the reservoir into a disused mine shaft and
flooded connecting passages into the plaintiff's
adjoining mine. The actual work was done by independent contractors who were probably negligent
and the defendants were ignorant of the old mine
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workings and free from all personal blame. Strict
liability was held upon the theory that the storage
of water constituted an absolute nuisance and the
court pointed out that storage of water in this situation was inappropriate in a mining country.
The construction of a parking lot was appropriate and was a necessity on the University of Utah
campus.
As the cases involving the escape of animals,
fire, and blasting show private persons in Utah are
not strictly liable for dangerous or defective conditions or extrahazardous activities, the University
of Utah in accordance with legislative intent expressed in §63-30-4 of the Immunity Act should
not be held strictly liable for dangerous or defective
conditions.
Section 63-30-13 of the Immunity Act provides that
claims against a city or town shall be governed by
the provisions of §10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
In Niblock vs. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573,
111 P.2d 800 ( 1941), the plaintiff tried to impose
liability on Salt Lake City by showing his damage
was caused by the defective and unsafe and dangerous condition of the street. In commenting on
the plaintiff's contention the court said that the
obstructed condition of the street gives rise to no
Iiabiliy as the city has taken proper precautions
such as the erection of adequate barriers and warn27

1
I

ings and stated that negligence must be shown to
establish liability.
In later cases cited under §10-7-77 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, as a condition for
recovery each plaintiff has been required to show
negligence and not merely a defect in the street.
In Wilson vs. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 234, 371
P .2d 644 ( 1962), where a manhole was missing, the
plaintiff was required to show negligence on the
part of tne city in failing to replace the manhole
cover. Again in Nyman vs. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d
45, 361 P. 2d 1114 (1961, where a guest in an
automobile brought an action against the city for
injuries incurred when the automobile in which she
was riding ran into an unmarked street obstruction
consisting of a row of dirt with a protruding culvert proof of negligence was required.
Other state Governmental Immunity Acts limit
liability for dangerous or defective conditions to
negligence. Section 53-05-1 of the California Go':ernment Code provides:
"A local agency is liable for injuries to
persons and property resulting from the da1:gerous or defective use of public property if
the legislative body, board or person authorized to remedy the con di ti on :
a. Have knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition.
b. For a reasonable time after acquiring
knowledge of receiving notice of failure to rem28

edy the condition or to take action reasonably
necessary to protect the public against the
condition."
The California Court of Appeals in Gentekos
vs. City and County of San Francisco, 329 P.2d 943
(1958), said as a condition to recovery the plaintiff
must show that there is:

1. A dangerous or defective condition.
2. That the city had knowledge and notice of
the defective condition.
3. That the condition must exist a reasonable
time after acquiring such knowledge so that the city
has a reasonable opportunity to repair the condition.
California has not interpreted its act to make
a government entity strictly liable for defective
conditions.
In summary the University of Utah submits it
should not be held liable for a defective condition
without negligence because:
A. Private individuals in Utah are not liable
for defective conditions without negligence.
B. Under §10-7-77 cities and towns are not
liable for defective conditions without a showing of
negligence.
C. No intent is expressed in the Governmental
Immunity Act to make a governmental entity
strictly liable for dangerous or defective conditions.
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POINT III
THERE IS NO WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY.

The operation of a school is a governmental
function. Campbell vs. Pack and Granite Board of
Education, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 (1964).
The Governmental Immunity Act, chapter 30
of title 63, does not provide waiver of immunity for
claims arising for maintenance of a nuisance. It
is also specifically provided in the Governmental
Immunity Act §63-30-10 that immunity is not
waived for damages arising from the performance
or failure to perform a discretionary function and
for damages arising out of the failure to make an
inspection or by reason of making an inadequate
or negligent inspection of property.
Prior to adoption of the Governmental Immunity Act the construction, maintenance and operation
of streets, storm sewers and drainage systems were
governmental functions and therefore not actionable. See Wilkinson vs. State, 42 Utah 483, 134
Pac. 626 (1913); Cobia vs. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d
375, 366 P.2d 986; Reeder vs. Brigham City, 17
Utah 2d 398, 413 P.2d 300 (1966).
Section 78-30-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
defines nuisance as an obstruction to the free use
of property so as to interfere with comfortable enjoyment of property. In Reeder vs. Brigham Citu,
supra, the city collected water in a storm drain and
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caused the water to be dumped on the plaintiff's
property. The lower court granted an injunction
against the city and allowed the plaintiff damages.
On appeal this court reversed the judgment for damages holding that governmental immunity had not
been waived for liability arising from the nuisance.
1

If the maintenance of the parking lot consti-

tutes a threat to the plaintiff's property, it is a
nuisance.
1'
There is no specific waiver of immunity in the
1 Governmental Immunity Act for liability arising
I from maintenance of a nuisance and as §63-30-3
specifically provides there is no waiver of immunity
' except as otherwise provided in the act the univer1 sity submits it was unreasonable for the lower court
to hold immunity was waived for liability arising
I out of defective conditions in the peripheral road or
the parking lot.
The exceptions in §63-30-10 to the waiver of
immunity as the performance of the discretionary
function or the failure to perform a discretionary
function raise a question as to what is or is not a
discretionary function.
In Rollow vs. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243
Pac. 791 (1926), this court said in locating and
opening streets and regulating travel a city was
engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function.
There is no Utah case discussing whether or not
the design and construction of a parking lot is a
discretionary function. However, in Velasquez 'VS.

I
I

I

I
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Union Pacific Railroad Co., 24 Utah 2d 217, 469
P.2d 5 (1970), a case where a passenger in a
pickup truck brought an action against the State
of Utah Public Service Commission and the Union
Pacific Railroad claiming the Public Service Commission had a duty to protect the public by requiring
proper and adequate safety devices at the rajlroad
crossing and that the Public Safety Commission was
in that it did not require the railroad to
install an adequate protective device and to establish a program to discover dilapidated signs, hence
inspecting the property to locate defective conditions. This court said even if it were assumed that
the failure to have the most improved warning signs
at the railroad crossing were a defect in the highway,
immunity was not waived under §63-30-8 as it was
the discretionary function on the part of the Public
Service Commission to determine what signs the
law required at railroad crossings.·
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§2671-80 there is a general waiver of sovereign
immunity as to all tort claims except those arising
within specified categories. One of the excepted
categories relates to claims based upon the exercise or the performance or the failure to exercise
and perform a discretionary function on the part
of the federal agency. The federal cases involving
this exclusion generally hold that where the nature
of the undertaking itself covers the damage there
is no waiver of sovereign immunity.
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In Boyce vs. United States, D.C. Ill. 93 F.
Supp. 866 ( 1950), a case involving property damage arising from blasting by the corps of engineers,
the court said that since the plans for the project
had been approved by the chief of engineers and
the work had been done accordingly with a discretionary function involved that the claim of the plaintiff was barred.
In Coates vs. United States, 8 Cir. Mo, 181
F.2d 816 ( 1950), the court affirmed a decision denying recovery to the plaintiff who alleged that their
land and crops had been damaged by an unusual
overflow of the river resulting from the changes
the government made, saying that the Federal Tort
Claims Act was specifically designed to preclude the
possibility that the government might be held liable
for an action growing out of an authorized activity
such as flood control or irrigation projects.
In United States vs. Ure, 9 Cir. Ore. 225 F.2d
709 ( 1955), the court held that whether or not to
line a canal with concrete in certain areas and not
line it with concrete in other areas was clearly a
discretionary function and the claim of the plaintiff
was barred.
In California vs. United States, D.C. Cal. 146
F. Supp. 341 ( 1956), the state's complaint was dismissed in which it was alleged the state highway
was damaged as a result of the collection of surface
waters thereon allegedly as the result of the govern33

ment's negligence in the construction of a canal, pipeline, culverts, ditches and channels, all a part of a
government recreation project, the court saying that
the alleged injury was the result of the discretionary
function on the part of the United States to which
immunity from suit had not been waived.
North vs. United States, D.C. Utah 94 F. Supp.
824 ( 1950), involved a claim for the plaintiff for
damage to flooding of a cellar and cesspool because
of the construction of a darn which raised the water
table in the area. The United States District Court
held that the interference of the free and natural
underground flow of ground waters invloved the
exercise of a discretionary function and stated that
no recovery could be had.
In Sisley vs. United States, D.C. Alas. 202 F.
Supp. 273 ( 1962), a claim was made for damage to
a claimant's property due to the interruption of the
natural flow of surface water away from it. It
was claimed that in building the highway the United
States had caused the roadway to be compacted so
as to prevent the flow of water under it and failed
to provide adequate culverts for surface drainage.
Recovery was denied on the ground that immunity
was not waived for the participation of the United
States in the construction of a public highway.
In Mahler vs. United States, 3 Cir. Pa. 306 F.2d
713 (1962), certiorari denied, 371 U.S. 923, 9 L. Ed.
231, 83 Sup. Ct. 290, recovery was denied to a claim34

ant wherein he suffered damages when his vehicle
collided with a boulder on the highway. The claimant contended the government was liable for his
damages inasmuch as the Secretary of Commerce
had approved defective plans for the highway project and had failed to discover faulty construction
and had failed to make an inspection after construction was completed. In affirming a judgment
in favor of the government, the court said that to
approve plans and designs, along with participation
with the state in building the highway was a discretionary function, not an operation function and that
immunity was not waived.
The inclusion of subparagraph 4 of §63-30-10
excepts state entities from liability that arises out
of their failure to make inspections of property.
The University of Utah submits that the inclusion
of this subsection was for the purpose of making it
clear that the university had to have notice of a
condition that was defective or dangerous and that
government entities had no affirmative duty to
constantly inspect propery so as to locate dangerous
or defective conditions. This court should follow
r elasquez vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra, in
interpreting the act to l'equire the exceptions in §10
to apply to defective conditions. To hold that the
. exceptions in §10 of the Immunity Act do not apply
to
8 and 9 of the act relating to dangerous or
defective conditions, will emasculate the effect of the
exceptions in §10. Claimants would avoid the excep35

tions in §10 merely by bringing suit against the state
agencies for the dangerous or defective condition and
not for the negligence of employees. Is it reasonable
to believe the legislature intended a state agency to
submit to liability for a dangerous defective condition
without notice where it was specifically provided in
the act under §10 it should not be liable for the failure to inspect state property or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection? The answer
is no. It seems more reasonable to believe that subparagraph 4 in §10 was included to show that a
state agency had no duty to inspect highways to
see that they were not icy, that curves were not too
sharp, that guardrails were proper and that chuckholes or other hazards did not exist. The purpose
of subsection 4 of §10 appears to be to support and
enforce the discretionary function exception and to
limit the agencies' liability for defective conditions
of which it had actual notice.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed because:
1. The defective conditions were not caused
or created by persons under the supervision or control of the University of Utah.

2. The University of Utah is not an insurer
against injury nor is it strictly liable for damages
arising from defective or dangerous conditions.
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3. There is no waiver of immunity for damages arising from a nuisance.
4. The failure of the University of Utah to
discover the plugged catch basins and drains arises
from its failure to exercise a discretionary function
or from its failure to inspect property for which
immunity is not waived.
5. The lower court committed prejudicial error
in instructing the jury that the University of Utah
was liable for dangerous or defective conditions not
arising from negligence.
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